By Kevin Ruane (auth.)
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Extra info for The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950–55
12 Eden, fearing that the EDC negotiations might collapse and that Washington would cast Britain as the scapegoat for failure, felt compelled to respond positively, proposing to the Cabinet on 4 April that there should now be ‘two separate guarantees of support’ for the EDC. The ﬁrst would be an Anglo-American declaration reafﬁrming their resolve to maintain armed forces in Europe for as long as they were needed and specifying that a threat to the EDC’s integrity from ‘whatever quarter’, external or internal, would be regarded as a threat to NATO itself.
In Bonn, Adenauer had shown himself ‘a strong believer in the whole idea’. 65 Dulles had certainly been at his most insistent during the Paris leg of his trip, treating the French to a sermon on how they had 46 The Crisis Looms ‘given us in America a vision which has very much caught our imagination, and great disappointment and disillusionment would result if after you have brought us up to the mountain top and showed us this vision, we were to be led down again into the valley’. 66 Nor was Dulles using the implied threat of a review of US commitments in Europe merely as a device to bring wayward allies into line.
45 They were also essential, in a wider sense, if public opinion throughout Western Europe was to remain convinced of the necessity for on-going sacriﬁces, whether in terms of taxation or overall standard-of-living, in order to obtain NATO’s maximum security goals. Any slackening in the European defence effort, London and Washington feared, would furnish Malenkov with a tremendous Cold War victory. Harold Macmillan, reﬂecting in June 1953 on the divisions that were already opening up in the Atlantic Alliance as a result of Moscow’s ‘peace offensive’, noted the irony of the situation.