By Brian McAllister Linn
From Lexington and Gettysburg to Normandy and Iraq, the wars of the USA have outlined the country. yet after the weapons fall silent, the military searches the teachings of previous conflicts so that it will arrange for the subsequent conflict of hands. within the echo of conflict, the military develops the ideas, guns, doctrine, and commanders that it hopes will warrantly a destiny victory.
In the face of greatly new methods of waging warfare, Brian Linn surveys the prior assumptions--and errors--that underlie the army's many visions of battle as much as the current day. He explores the army's forgotten background of deterrence, its lengthy event with counter-guerrilla operations, and its successive efforts to rework itself. Distinguishing 3 martial traditions--each with its personal idea of struggle, its personal strategic perspectives, and its personal excuses for failure--he locates the visionaries who ready the military for its battlefield triumphs and the reactionaries whose blunders contributed to its defeats.
Discussing commanders as varied as Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and Colin Powell, and applied sciences from coastal artillery to the Abrams tank, he exhibits how management and weaponry have consistently altered the army's method of clash. And he demonstrates the army's behavior of getting ready for wars that seldom ensue, whereas ignoring these it needs to really struggle. in line with exhaustive study and interviews, The Echo of Battle offers an extraordinary reinterpretation of the way the U.S. military has waged warfare long ago and the way it truly is assembly the recent demanding situations of tomorrow.
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Additional resources for The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War
They agreed that the nation’s strategy should be defensive and deterrent. Like the board, they envisioned no scenario that required committing the army to combat operations outside of the North American continent. Where the board cited the War of 1812, its critics now cited the Cri- fortress america 29 mean War and other conflicts, but they shared similar conclusions about the hostile intentions of the international community and the necessity for a coherent defense program. And, like the board, its critics proved exceedingly poor prophets of the next war.
32 The Guardian paradigm itself was so strong within the pre– Civil War army that criticism was not only rare but limited to discussing means, not ends. After a war scare with France, Secretary of War Lewis Cass argued that the defense system was too ambitious and expensive and was predicated on the unlikely scenario of an invasion. 33 Four years later, the veteran frontier officer Major General Edmund Gaines echoed Cass in dismissing fortifications as obsolete and urging the adoption of steam batteries and mines.
Some focused narrowly on tactics or weapons, while others sought a radical revision of national security policy; some believed war was becoming more rational and humane, while others saw it as increasingly destructive and unpredictable. But despite their many differences, military intellectuals shared certain assumptions. They all believed that a technological, organizational, and conceptual revolution in military affairs was under way. They were convinced that the United States was vulnerable to attack by its European rivals.