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Extra resources for Jagdwaffe - Blitzkrieg and Sitzkrieg Poland and France 1939-1940
Sigal, Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 12–16; Abraham Ben-Zvi, The Illusion of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the Origins of the Pacific War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 7; Zeev Maoz, National Choices and International Processes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 151–7. 10. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn (New York: Longman, 1999), p.
466–96; Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, p. 14; Gideon Doron and Itai Sened, Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process (London: Sage Publications, 2001), p. Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 181–3, 187; Stephen J. Majeski and Shane Fricks, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 (1995), pp. 622–45; Joanne Gowa, ‘Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations’, International Organization, 40 (1986), pp.
809–24. Larson, ‘The Psychology of Reciprocity’, p. 285. See also McGilligvray and Smith, ‘Trust and Cooperation’, p. 810. Patchen, Resolving Disputes Between Nations, p. 268. Ben-Zvi, Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales, p. 93. 1 In early 1961, the Kennedy Administration embarked upon a major diplomatic effort which was designed to improve relations with Egypt. Convinced that, in view of President Nasser’s ‘desire not to become too dependent on the Soviet Union,’ American diplomacy was provided with an exquisite opportunity to exert ‘some restraining influence on [Egyptian policies] by creating a vested interest, on Nasser’s part, in good relations with the US,’2 President Kennedy moved quickly to vastly increase the level of economic assistance to Egypt (particularly the PL480 surplus wheat program) without making it contingent upon any specific political or economic preconditions.