By Janne Haaland Matlary (auth.)
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Extra info for European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest
Legitimation, particularly by the UN, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for using force among Western states. Intervention practice has not led to any new rule for using force – neither for humanitarian intervention nor for preventive intervention against terrorists. Rather, the situation appears very unclear regarding the rules for using force. With the advent of global strategic terrorism, the need for regime change is no longer solely motivated by humanitarian ‘value’ concerns, but also and probably foremost by security policy concerns.
Throughout the cold war, force was needed to deter the other side from doing bad things outside its borders; today, force is needed to compel the other side to do good things inside its borders’, an analyst aptly summarises it (Prince in Hyde-Price, 2004, p. 338). The spectre of tasks known as ‘crisis management’ or peace support operations (PSOs) has a ‘do-goodist’ side which is of considerable political importance as well as a more traditional Realpolitik side which involves stark choices of national interest and deterrence against spill-over and terrorist activity.
A Frenchman is no longer required because he defends the French nation or French territory; as it was in the period of the Napoleonic or nation-state paradigm. Today, one could think of a French-force contribution being made up of say, 50 per cent French and 50 per cent from other nationalities, but still fighting under the French standard. My point is the simple one that nationality matters less and less in a professional force. Like soccer teams that are national in name and banner, they are now made up of professionals.